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Abstract 
 
It is known that the memory is relevant in the symmetric phase of the minority 
game. In our previous work we have successfully explained the quasi-periodic 
behavior of the game in the symmetric phase with the help of the probability theory. 
Based on this explanation, we are able to determine how the memory affects the 
variance of the system in this paper. By using some particular types of fake history 
such as periodic type and random type, we determine how efficient the memory has 
been used in the standard game. Furthermore, the analysis on the effective memory 
strongly supports the result we proposed previously that there are three distinct phases 
in the minority game. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The minority game (MG)[1] is a simple model that can capture the essence of 
some features of the financial markets. The game is played by N agents in choosing 
one of two decisions. Those who are in the minority are rewarded one point. Suppose 
these N agents play the game many times, what outcome would be expected? Is there 
any statistical pattern? Can one of the agents manage to gain most? To answer these 
questions we need to take data from a MG played by real people which waits to be 
done[2]. Current study of the MG is to simulate the game on computers by assuming 
that each agent has a given type of strategy in choosing a decision. The standard MG 
[1] assumes that at each time, the winning decision of the last M time steps is known 
to each agent and each agent uses this information to make his decision according to 
one of his S strategies set up in the beginning of the game. A strategy is nothing but a 
list of all possible pieces of information with an arbitrary decision assigned to each of 
them. The parameter M is called the memory. A common piece of information consists 
of the winning decisions of last M time steps is called a history. There are MP 2=  
possible histories in a strategy. Agents evaluate their strategies by giving a virtual 
point to all strategies that have matched the winning decision at a time step, and use 
the best-scored one among his S strategies to make decision. 
As one simulates the standard MG many times, the average of the number of 
winning agents is found to be, as expected, N/2. The variance per agent of winning 
population χ , on the other hand, has an interesting dependence on the parameter 
NP /=α [3] that attracts many researchers. Cavagna[4] claimed that the global 
properties of χ  is irrelevant to the information of the winning history by simulating 
the game with a random history at each time step and found the results were the same. 
Further quantitative studies[5] showed that the variance were not quite the same when 
different histories (winning history or random history) were used. Recently, Ho et al[6] 
has carried out a large scale numerical simulation to calculate χ  in the 1<<α  
region, called symmetric phase[7,8]. Results of using winning and random histories 
differ substantially in the symmetric phase. 
People have found the behavior of the MG very interesting in the symmetric 
phase. In particular, the winning population changes quasi-periodically with a period 
of 2P[9,10,11]. It is now understood[12] that when α  is very small, all strategies 
will be almost guaranteed to gain the same (P) points at the end of time step 2P so 
that at the time step 12 +P  no strategy is preferred and the system is like going back 
to time step 1. Liaw et al[13] has calculated analytically the critical value 
1c
α  such 
that in the region 
1c
αα <  the quasi-periodic behavior would appear. They employed 
a simple series of histories to explain the quasi-periodic behavior and calculated 
1c
α . 
We will introduce this series of histories in Sec. II and compare its values of χ  with 
results of using true histories. We define effective memory in Sec. III and then 
calculate it for different types of rules in the symmetric phase. Sec. V is conclusion. 
 
II. Three kinds of history-updating rules 
 
Let two possible decisions be 0 and 1. A history is then an M-digit binary number. 
At each time step, in the standard game the history is updated by dropping its first 
digit and attaching the winning decision to the end. We call this the standard updating 
rule for the history. In the standard updating rule, exactly two histories can be updated 
to each history, and each history can be updated to exactly two possible histories. A de 
Bruijn graph shows all the paths of the standard updating rule(Fig. 1a). One can see 
from Fig. 1a there are many loops in a de Bruijn graph. If instead an arbitrary history 
is given at each time step, we call it the random updating rule. Any history can follow 
a history with probability P/1 . Random rule has been used by Caragna[4] to show 
the variation of χ  with respect to α  is qualitatively the same with that of using 
standard rule. Challet et al[14] has developed an exact solution for MG using random 
rule. A third updating rule, introduced by Liaw et al[12], is all possible histories take 
turns to appear regardless of what winning decisions are. If we order all possible 
histories by their decimal values, the rule can be arranged simply as history 0 is 
followed by history 1, and history 1 followed by 2, etc., and history P followed by 0. 
We call this the periodic updating rule whose path has only one loop(Fig. 1b). The 
periodic rule is simple and suitable for analytic analysis[12,13]. It can also be 
extended to study so called Thermal minority game[15]. Other updating rules are also 
available, but we will consider only the standard, random, and periodic rules in this 
paper. 
Fig. 2 is a plot of typical results of variance per agent χ  as a function of α  
using the standard, random, and periodic rules respectively. We see that results of 
these three rules are qualitatively alike. We separate the plot into three regions by two 
dotted line: 
1c
αα =  and 
2c
αα = . 
2c
α  is defined as the critical value of α  at 
which χ  has its minimum. It is not clear whether 
2c
α  has a common value for 
three different rules. For α  larger than 
2c
α , χ  monotonically increases and 
approaches ¼ which is the result of a random system—every agent uses random 
strategy at each time. For α  smaller than 
1c
α , χ  is larger than ¼ and 
approximately proportional to α/1 [13]. In this region the values of χ  depend on 
the rules strongly. In the second region, as α  increases from 
1c
α  to 
2c
α , the value 
of χ  decreases, drops below ¼ and reaches its minimum. Behavior of the system in 
this transition region is very interesting but hardly studied. In what follows we will 
focus on the symmetric phase 
1c
αα <  only. 
 
III. Definition of effective memory 
 
It is known that the system shows a quasi-periodic behavior in the first region 
1c
αα <  no matter what rule is used. From Fig. 2 we see that the log-plot of χ  
versus α  are roughly parallel in the first region and the order of the values of χ  is 
pdstrd χχχ <<  for a given P. We may consider the χ  versus α  curve as a 
demand curve in microeconomics. When the demand decreases, the curve shifts to the 
left. Thus if we define the demand (of information) as the effective information P′ , or 
equicalently, effective memory )(log2 PM ′=′  of the game, we expect 
pdstrd PPP ′<′<′  and χ  (the price) will be a monotonic increasing function of P′ . 
To find a suitable definition for P′ , we simply construct a relation between χ  
and P′ . As we play the game again and again, when a history appears a second time, 
the path of the histories—the history and all histories between its two consecutive 
appearances, forms a loop. It was found[16,12] for small α  case that when a loop is 
found, or equivalently, when a history appears a second time, the winning decision is 
most likely be different from that of the last time when the history appeared. The 
quasi-periodic behavior is result of this property. In Ref. [12] we have shown that 
when a history appears a second time, the population variance will shift away from 0 
by a value which is inversely proportional to the number l of histories that have 
appeared odd times. And the average variance per agent over a quasi-period 2P is 
given by[13] 
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where Sc  is a constant dependent on the number of strategies S, and 1/8 comes from 
the contributions of P time steps when system behaves in random fashion. The 
summation is over all loops. Let us consider the case of using periodic rule first. At 
time step 1+P , the history that appears in the time step 1 appears the second time, 
and all P histories have appeared once right before the loop is closed. At time 
step 2+P , the second history appears the second time, and 1−P  histories have 
appeared once. In the same manner, the number l of histories that have appeared once 
when a loop is just to be closed decreases by 1 in the subsequent time steps. At time 
step 2P, l is equal to 1. Consequently, average variance per agent over a quasi-period 
2P is given by 
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where γ  is Euler’s constant: 5772.0=γ . For fixed P, 8/1−pdχ  is proportional to 
1−α , as expected from numerical simulation. For fixed α , 8/1−pdχ  is 
proportional to γ+Plog . Because the periodic rule is the simplest rule for analysis, 
we use it as a base for comparison. That is, we define PPpd =′ . We then calculate 
rdχ  and stχ  and assume they have the form Eq. (2) with the effective information 
rdP′  and stP′  respectively.  
 
IV. Calculation of the effective memory 
 
As we play the game again and again, there will be loops in the path of 
histories. Let us define the time-step difference between two consecutive appearances 
of a history the length of the loop. A longer loop means there are more histories have 
appeared odd times when the end of the loop is reached. And we have seen in the last 
section that χ  is affected by the number of histories have appeared odd times when a 
particular history appears a second time. Therefore, the knowledge of the distribution 
of the lengths in a game is important to understand the variance.  
When we use the periodic rule to update the history in playing the game, it is 
very easy to see that all loops have the same length, which is simply equal to P. If 
either the standard rule or random rule is used, the lengths of loops vary. We plot the 
frequency versus length ranging from 1 to 2P in Fig. 3 by playing the game 2P time 
steps and taking average of 650 runs. The length-distribution plot for the case of 
random rule can be calculated as follows. The probability of length 1 is 1/P because 
there is only one choice out of P that matches current history. The probability of 
length 2 is the probability of choosing a history not the same as the current one in the 
second time step and getting the current history again in the third time step. It is 
PP
P 11 ⋅− . Similarly, we can obtain the probability of length x: 
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At each of 2P time steps we can check whether a length-1 loop will appear. However, 
only the first xP −2  time steps are possible to be the beginning of a length-x loop. 
Thus the length distribution is given by 
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The average length for random rule can be found for large P to be 
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 When the standard updating rule is used, each history is followed by one of two 
fixed histories (Fig. 1a). If we order all histories according to their decimal values 
1,,2,1,0 −= Pi L , we see that the i-history is followed by either 2i mod P or 12 +i  
mod P(Fig. 1a). If we start from i-history, what is the probability that the i-history will 
appear again after x time steps[5]? A moment’s reflection shows that the final history 
is given by jix +2  mod P, with j ranging from 0 to 12 −x . Assume there are s final 
values among all x2  possible values satisfying  jix +2  mod P i= , which is 
equivalent to 
 
        jix +− )12(  mod P 0=                                       (6) 
 
For the small α  case, because its quasi-periodic behavior, most histories appear the 
same times within first 2P time steps (Fig. 4). It is thus a good approximation that the 
probability of length x is related to the average of s over all possible i, denoted by )(xs . 
Now, i can be one of 0, 1, 2, …, P-1, so the value jix +− )12(  can be any integer in 
0, 1, 2, …, Px )12( − . It is easy to see that there are x2  values among them are 
multiple of P. So we have Pxs x /2)( = . Notice these x2  solutions for length x have 
included all solutions of smaller lengths which are factors of x. So we have to subtract 
them from x2  in obtaining the probability of length x. For example, the probabilities 
of length 1 to length 6 are given below. 
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These values are consistent with the numerical results shown in inset of Fig. 3b. The 
probability of length x is close to 1/P for large x because the contributions from its 
factors are very small comparing to x2 . To obtain the length distribution one has to 
take two factors into consideration. First, the probability )(xpst  has to be weighted 
by the factor xP −2  as explained in the random case. Second, in the standard 
updating rule, when a history appears first time, it is followed by one of two possible 
histories. In the case of small α  that we consider here, when the history appears the 
second time, it will be followed by the other history of the two[16,12]. That is, two 
appearances of a history compensate for each other in determining the probability of 
finding a loop of length x. Thus we have to weight the distribution by a factor 1/2. The 
length distribution is then given by 
 
        
P
xxpxPxg
xstst 2
1)()2(
2
1)(
1
−≈⋅−⋅= >>                            (8) 
 
The average length for the standard rule is 
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From Eqs. (5) and (9), we have Pxxx pdstrd =<< , with its order consistent with 
order of  rdχ , stχ , pdχ  shown in Fig. 2. 
 To calculate rdχ and stχ according to Eq. (1), we need to know the distribution 
of l for standard and random rules: )(lhst  and )(lhrd . Results of simulations, 
averaging 1000 runs, are plotted in Fig. 5. The values for rdχ and stχ  are therefore 
given by 
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From Eqs. (10), (11), we can determine effective information for standard and random 
rules. Results of rdP′  and stP′  for some different values of P are listed in Table 1. For 
fixed N, P can not be too small in order the statistical analysis to be valid. P can not 
be too large either so that α  will not leave symmetric phase[17]. 
 
 
Table 1  Effective information 
( 20001=N , 2=S , average of 5000 runs) 
 
P 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024
pdP′  16 32 64 128 256 512 1024
rdP′  3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 
stP′  5.0 6.4 8.0 10.4 14.0 18.9 24.2
 
 
As a test for our values of effective memories given in Table 1, in Fig. 6 we plot 
rdχ and stχ  versusα  for 64=P . The former coincides very well with the curve 
of pdχ  for 4=P  as predicted in Table 1. The latter coincides better with the curve 
of pdχ for 10=P  instead of 8=P  as predicted in Table 1. Qualitatively, the 
calculations of the effective memory are satisfactory. 
From Table 1 we found the results of effective information are very interesting. 
The effective information for random rule rdP′  is almost independent of P. In terms 
of effective memory, 2≈′rdM  for any M. On the other hand, the effective 
information for standard rule stP′  is a monotonic function of P. The corresponding 
effective memory has a linear relation with M: 742.0384.0 +=′ MM st (Fig. 7). 
Further investigation is in order. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
    We have simulated the minority game in the symmetric phase. The results 
showed that the variance of winning population χ  in this phase is approximately 
inverse-proportional to information per agent per strategy α . We used three kinds of 
rules-- standard, random, and periodic rules--to update the history and found their 
results were qualitatively similar but differed in quantity substantially in the 
symmetric phase. We defined the effective memory for each updating rule based on a 
previous analysis to quantify their differences and showed how the results were 
dependent on the memory.  
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Figure captions 
Fig. 1 
(a) Standard game uses de Bruijn graph to update its history. A history i can be 
updated to history 2i or 12 +i  mod MP 2= . Here 3=M .  
(b) In the periodic rule, a history i is updated to 1+i  mod P regardless of the 
winning results. 
 
Fig. 2 
Variance per agent χ  versus information per agent α  using three different 
updating rules: periodic(triangle), standard(circle), and random(square). These curves 
show distinct behavior in each of the three regions separated at 
1c
α  and 
2c
α .  
 
Fig. 3 
Histogram(gray) of the length-distribution of the loops in a quasi-period 2P for (a) 
random rule and (b) standard rule. Thick lines are analytical results. Inset of Fig. 3(b) 
shows details of numerical results (black) for 6 short lengths. Analytical results (white) 
of Eq. (7) are also shown for comparison. 
 
Fig. 4 
A typical plot of appearing frequency versus history in a quasi-period 2P for standard 
rule.  
 
Fig. 5 
Distributions of the number of histories(l) that appear odd times when a loop is found 
for random rule(square) and standard rule(circle). 
 Fig. 6 
χ  versus α  in the symmetric region. Three solid lines are results using periodic 
rule with 64=P , 10, 4. Simulation results of standard rule(circle) and random 
rule(triangle) with 64=P  show to have effective information 10=′stP  and 
4=′rdP  respectively. 
 
Fig. 7 
Effective memory of standard rule stM ′  has a linear relation with the memory M. 
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